Philip Reny
Philip Reny
Department of Economics, University of Chicago
Verifierad e-postadress på uchicago.edu - Startsida
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Advanced Microeconomic Theory
GA Jehle, PJ Reny
Addison-Wesley, 2001
14722001
On the existence of pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria in discontinuous games
PJ Reny
Econometrica 67 (5), 1029-1056, 1999
7101999
Correlated information and mecanism design
RP McAfee, PJ Reny
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 395-421, 1992
4821992
A noncooperative view of coalition formation and the core
M Perry, PJ Reny
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 795-817, 1994
2301994
Arrow’s theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a unified approach
PJ Reny
Economics letters 70 (1), 99-105, 2001
1992001
Supplement to "Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium"
PJ Reny, M Perry
197*2006
An efficient auction
M Perry, PJ Reny
Econometrica 70 (3), 1199-1212, 2002
1972002
Toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium
PJ Reny, M Perry
Econometrica 74 (5), 1231-1269, 2006
1962006
On the existence of pure strategy monotone equilibria in asymmetric first‐price auctions
PJ Reny, S Zamir
Econometrica 72 (4), 1105-1125, 2004
1842004
Rationality in extensive-form games
PJ Reny
Journal of Economic perspectives 6 (4), 103-118, 1992
1731992
On the Existence of Monotone Pure‐Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games
PJ Reny
Econometrica 79 (2), 499-553, 2011
1712011
Backward induction, normal form perfection and explicable equilibria
PJ Reny
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 627-649, 1992
1671992
A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers
M Perry, PJ Reny
Journal of Economic Theory 59 (1), 50-77, 1993
1571993
Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information
PJ Reny
Journal of Economic Theory 59 (2), 257-274, 1993
1481993
Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
S Hart, PJ Reny
Theoretical Economics 10 (3), 893-922, 2015
1322015
Extracting the surplus in the common-value auction
RP McAfee, J McMillan, PJ Reny
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1451-1459, 1989
1321989
The existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in continuous games with almost perfect information: A case for public randomization
C Harris, P Reny, A Robson
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 507-544, 1995
1181995
On the failure of the linkage principle in multi-unit auctions
M Perry, PJ Reny
Econometrica 67 (4), 895-900, 1999
1131999
An efficient multi-unit ascending auction
M Perry, PJ Reny
The Review of Economic Studies 72 (2), 567-592, 2005
972005
On the strategic equivalence of extensive form games
S Elmes, PJ Reny
Journal of Economic Theory 62 (1), 1-23, 1994
931994
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Artiklar 1–20