Follow
Gabriel Tourek
Gabriel Tourek
Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Pittsburgh
Verified email at pitt.edu - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Local elites as state capacity: How city chiefs use local information to increase tax compliance in the democratic republic of the Congo
P Balán, A Bergeron, G Tourek, JL Weigel
American Economic Review 112 (3), 762-797, 2022
842022
The state capacity ceiling on tax rates: Evidence from randomized tax abatements in the drc
A Bergeron, GZ Tourek, JL Weigel
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2023
492023
Optimal assignment of bureaucrats: Evidence from randomly assigned tax collectors in the DRC
A Bergeron, P Bessone, JK Kabeya, GZ Tourek, JL Weigel
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2022
192022
Targeting in tax behavior: Evidence from Rwandan firms
G Tourek
Journal of Development Economics 158, 102911, 2022
182022
Using machine learning to improve property tax collection in the drc
A Bergeron, A Fournier, G Tourek, J Weigel
Technical Report 2020., Gabriel Tourek, and Jonathan Weigel,“The State …, 2020
152020
Hiring frictions and the promise of online job portals: Evidence from India
AN Fernando, N Singh, G Tourek
American Economic Review: Insights 5 (4), 546-562, 2023
72023
Land Formalization in Weak States: Experimental Evidence from Urban Property Titling in the DR Congo
P Balán, A Bergeron, G Tourek, J Weigel
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. Is this a book published by the Press, or …, 2020
62020
How Can Lower-Income Countries Collect More Taxes? The Role of Technology, Tax Agents, and Politics
O Okunogbe, G Tourek
Journal of Economic Perspectives 38 (1), 81-106, 2024
12024
Centralized vs. Local Taxation
P Balán, A Bergeron, G Tourek, J Weigel
Proceedings. Annual Conference on Taxation and Minutes of the Annual Meeting …, 2019
12019
Pre-analysis plan: the origins of tax compliance and state capacity
P BAL, A BERGERON, G TOUREK, JL WEIGEL
12018
How Can Lower-Income Countries Collect More Taxes?
O Okunogbe, G Tourek
Development Research, 2023
2023
Delegating Tax Collection Does Not Adversely Affect Demand for Accountability: Experimental Evidence from the DR Congo
M Ahrenshop, A Bergeron, L Paler, G Tourek, J Weigel
2023
DOES COLLECTING TAXES ERODE THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF INFORMAL LEADERS? EVIDENCE FROM THE DRC
A Bergeron, EK Ngindu, G Tourek, JL Weigel
2023
Delegating Tax Collection Does Not Adversely Affect Demand for Accountability: Evidence from an Experiment in the DR Congo
M Ahrenshop, A Bergeron, L Paler, G Tourek, J Weigel
2023
Using Machine Learning to Create a Property Tax Roll: Evidence from the City of Kananga, DR Congo
A Bergeron, A Fournier, JK Kabeya, G Tourek, JL Weigel
Institute of Development Studies, International Centre for Tax and …, 2023
2023
Optimal Assignment Of Bureaucrats: Evidence From Randomly Assigned Tax Collectors In The Drc
J Weigel, A Bergeron, P Bessone Tepedino, JK Kabeya, G Tourek
CEPR Discussion Papers, 2021
2021
Hiring Frictions in Urban Labor Markets: Experimental Evidence from India
N Singh, AN Fernando, G Tourek
2021
OPTIMAL ASSIGNMENT OF BUREAUCRATS
A Bergeron, P Bessone, JK Kabeya, G Tourek, JL Weigel
2021
OPTIMAL ASSIGNMENT OF BUREAUCRATS
P Bessone, JK Kabeya, G Tourek, JL Weigel
2021
Tax Collection and Bureaucrat Performance: Experimental Evidence from the DRC
G Tourek
113th Annual Conference on Taxation, 2020
2020
The system can't perform the operation now. Try again later.
Articles 1–20