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Jeffrey Pawlick
Jeffrey Pawlick
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A game-theoretic taxonomy and survey of defensive deception for cybersecurity and privacy
J Pawlick, E Colbert, Q Zhu
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR) 52 (4), 1-28, 2019
1782019
Flip the cloud: Cyber-physical signaling games in the presence of advanced persistent threats
J Pawlick, S Farhang, Q Zhu
Decision and Game Theory for Security: 6th International Conference, GameSec …, 2015
992015
Strategic trust in cloud-enabled cyber-physical systems with an application to glucose control
J Pawlick, Q Zhu
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 12 (12), 2906-2919, 2017
762017
Modeling and analysis of leaky deception using signaling games with evidence
J Pawlick, E Colbert, Q Zhu
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 14 (7), 1871-1886, 2018
752018
Deception by design: evidence-based signaling games for network defense
J Pawlick, Q Zhu
Workshop on the Economics of Information Security, Delft, The Netherlands, 2015
732015
iSTRICT: An interdependent strategic trust mechanism for the cloud-enabled internet of controlled things
J Pawlick, J Chen, Q Zhu
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 14 (6), 1654-1669, 2018
562018
Game theory for cyber deception
J Pawlick, Q Zhu
Springer International Publishing, 2021
482021
A Stackelberg game perspective on the conflict between machine learning and data obfuscation
J Pawlick, Q Zhu
2016 IEEE International Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS …, 2016
38*2016
Proactive defense against physical denial of service attacks using poisson signaling games
J Pawlick, Q Zhu
International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, 336-356, 2017
242017
A mean-field stackelberg game approach for obfuscation adoption in empirical risk minimization
J Pawlick, Q Zhu
2017 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing (GlobalSIP …, 2017
232017
Game‐Theoretic Analysis of Cyber Deception: Evidence‐Based Strategies and Dynamic Risk Mitigation
T Zhang, L Huang, J Pawlick, Q Zhu
Modeling and Design of secure Internet of Things, 27-58, 2020
212020
Optimal timing in dynamic and robust attacker engagement during advanced persistent threats
J Pawlick, TTH Nguyen, E Colbert, Q Zhu
2019 International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc …, 2019
102019
A Systems Science Perspective on Deception for Cybersecurity in the Internet of Things
J Pawlick
New York University Tandon School of Engineering, 2018
92018
Quantitative models of imperfect deception in network security using signaling games with evidence [IEEE CNS 17 Poster]
J Pawlick, Q Zhu
2017 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS), 394-395, 2017
62017
Analysis of leaky deception for network security using signaling games with evidence
J Pawlick, E Colbert, Q Zhu
Workshop Econ. Inf. Secur, 2018
42018
Nash and Stackelberg games
J Pawlick, Q Zhu, J Pawlick, Q Zhu
Game Theory for Cyber Deception: From Theory to Applications, 13-26, 2021
22021
Game-theoretic analysis of cyber deception
T Zhang, L Huang, J Pawlick, Q Zhu
Modeling and Design of Secure Internet of Things 54, 4649815, 2020
22020
Active crowd defense
J Pawlick, Q Zhu, J Pawlick, Q Zhu
Game Theory for Cyber Deception: From Theory to Applications, 147-167, 2021
12021
Insights and future directions
J Pawlick, Q Zhu, J Pawlick, Q Zhu
Game Theory for Cyber Deception: From Theory to Applications, 171-174, 2021
12021
A Taxonomy of Defensive Deception
J Pawlick, Q Zhu, J Pawlick, Q Zhu
Game Theory for Cyber Deception: From Theory to Applications, 37-48, 2021
12021
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Artiklar 1–20