Patrick DeGraba
Patrick DeGraba
Verifierad e-postadress på ftc.gov
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Buying frenzies and seller-induced excess demand
P DeGraba
The RAND Journal of Economics, 331-342, 1995
2121995
Input market price discrimination and the choice of technology
P DeGraba
The American Economic Review 80 (5), 1246-1253, 1990
2121990
Bill and keep at the central office as the efficient interconnection regime
PJ DeGraba
Federal Communications Commission, Office of Plans and Policy, 2000
1202000
Efficient intercarrier compensation for competing networks when customers share the value of a call
P DeGraba
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 12 (2), 207-230, 2003
852003
The economics of open source software: a survey of the early literature
A Schiff
Review of Network Economics 1 (1), 66-74, 2002
762002
Downstream integration by a bottleneck input supplier whose regulated wholesale prices are above costs
G Biglaiser, P DeGraba
RAND Journal of Economics, 302-315, 2001
762001
The loss leader is a turkey: Targeted discounts from multi-product competitors
P DeGraba
International journal of industrial organization 24 (3), 613-628, 2006
672006
The loss leader is a turkey: Targeted discounts from multi-product competitors
P DeGraba
International journal of industrial organization 24 (3), 613-628, 2006
672006
Spillover effects, cost savings, R&D and the use of brand extensions
P DeGraba, MW Sullivan
International Journal of Industrial Organization 13 (2), 229-248, 1995
651995
The effects of price restrictions on competition between national and local firms
PJ DeGraba
The RAND Journal of Economics, 333-347, 1987
531987
Quantity discounts from risk averse sellers
P DeGraba
FTC Bureau of Economics working paper, 2005
402005
Ideological persuasion in the media
DJ Balan, P DeGraba, AL Wickelgren
Available at SSRN 637304, 2004
372004
Bill and keep as the efficient interconnection regime?: A Reply
P DeGraba
Review of Network Economics 1 (1), 2002
352002
Intertemporal mixed bundling and buying frenzies
P DeGraba, R Mohammed
The RAND Journal of Economics, 694-718, 1999
341999
No lease is short enough to solve the time inconsistency problem
P DeGraba
The Journal of Industrial Economics, 361-374, 1994
341994
Exclusivity clauses and best price policies in input markets
P DeGraba, A Postlewaite
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 1 (3), 423-454, 1992
331992
Central office bill and keep as a unified inter-carrier compensation regime
P DeGraba
Yale J. on Reg. 19, 37, 2002
292002
A bottleneck input supplier's opportunity cost of competing downstream
P DeGraba
Journal of Regulatory Economics 23 (3), 287-297, 2003
282003
Why lever into a Zero‐Profit industry: Tying, foreclosure, and exclusion
P DeGraba
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 5 (3), 433-447, 1996
281996
Volume Discounts, Loss Leaders and Competition for More Profitable Customers
P DeGraba
FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper, 2003
202003
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Artiklar 1–20